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This comment analyzes the illicit antiquities trade from an international
vantage point by reviewing cases and regulations from many different
nations. An international perspective is essential in developing a compre-
hensive understanding of this subject, because illicit art trade is international
in nature; it involves the transportation of antiquities across national
boundaries. Yet, one must note the role the United States plays in the busi-
ness because it "is the largest single buyers' market for stolen or illegally
exported cultural property."'
Additionally, in discussing the factors that facilitate illicit antiquity trade,
one must remember that one factor or a combination of afew factors-as
opposed to all factors-may provide the catalyst for this trade; there is no set
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formula followed. Thus, this comment strives only to offer possibilities of
various factors that may contribute to the pervasive problem of illicit
antiquity trade.
I. INTRODUCTION
A debonair businessman calmly enters a museum in a nation's art capital.
He is a regular patron as evidenced by the ease and confidence with which
he maneuvers through the structure. While several thugs cause a ruckus in
one wing of the museum in an attempt to steal a priceless sculpture, the
suave man effortlessly nabs a multimillion dollar painting off the wall and
waltzes out the front door. Although the 1999 Hollywood remake of Thomas
Crown Affair may utilize much artistic license and may even seem improb-
able in the real world, the movie is correct in at least one respect: art theft is
a widespread international problem and the third largest area of international
crime, following only illegal drug smuggling and arms trading.' The
plundering of ancient sites for artifacts comprises nearly 90% of all art theft
transpiring in the world today.3
This comment explains why there currently exists a climate that actually
facilitates illicit trade in antiquities, and the factors contributing to it. In
order to describe these factors effectively and analyze their contribution to
the problem, this comment is divided into five Parts. Part I introduces the
problems inherent in the trade of antiquities. Part II examines the nature of
antiquity looting, which facilitates illicit trade because of (1) the difficulty of
defining both antiquities and crimes against antiquities, (2) the circum-
stances surrounding liquidation of antiquities, and (3) ambiguous title law.
Part III analyzes international and national measures taken in an attempt to
prevent art theft and to aid in the restitution of stolen works. International
and national regulations present a valid attempt to reduce the ease with
which illicit art trade occurs, but specific failures in such regulations under-
cut their main purpose. Additionally, conflicts in these regulations net out
their effectiveness. Part IV explores other factors-the supply and demand
of the black art market, and the laundering of illicit objects by the legitimate
art market (auction houses, dealers, collectors, and museums)-that facilitate
the commission of art crimes. Part V provides a case study of the famous
Elgin Marbles affair as a means of validating the ideas developed throughout
the comment. Finally, this comment concludes, in Part VI, that the prob-
2 Lisaj. Borodkin, TheEconomics ofAntiquities Lootinganda Proposed LegatAlternative, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 377, 377 (1995).
3 JOHN CONKLIN, ART CRIME 19 (1994).
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lems inherent in the illegal antiquities trade are deeper and more pervasive
than is commonly assumed.
II. THE LOOTING OF ANTIQUITIES
To facilitate an understanding of antiquities looting, this part first pro-
vides a brief historical overview of looting and quantifies the problem as it
exists today. Next, a definition of antiquity is provided, as well as an explana-
tion as to why the value, ease, and social circumstances surrounding the
liquidation of antiquities encourage illicit art trade. Additionally, this part
discusses the process that antiquities undergo to make their way from looter
to smuggler to buyer, and how ambiguous title laws facilitate this passage.
This part ends with an overview of secondary crimes that may occur after
the initial looting. Although this part strives to illustrate how the nature of
antiquities and social circumstances encourage looting, it is also designed to
provide background information on how and why antiquities are looted, as
well as acknowledge other crimes that are part and parcel to the initial thefts.
A. Overview
Looting is not a new phenomenon. One of the earliest recorded
examples dates back to Ancient Egypt. Only fifteen years after King
Tutankhamen's death in 1327 B.C., his tomb was pillaged ofprecious metals
and jewels.4 Nearly two thousand years later, Napoleon paraded a famous
group of bronze horses from the San Marco Basilica in Venice through the
streets of Paris.'
Since World War II, the looting of art has become even more prolific.
The International Criminal Police Organization ("INTERPOL") has
collected data that documents a distinct increase in art theft between 1965
and 1990.6 This increase may be attributed to a highly publicized article
written in 1969 by archeologist Clemency Chase Coggins. In the article,
Coggins showed that many prominent and well-respected museums owned
Pre-Columbian art collections which were, at one time, looted from ancient
South American archeological sites.7 Before the Coggins article, the magni-
tude and harmful effects of the illicit antiquities trade were not well docu-
4 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 158.
5 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 232.
6 See CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 5.
7 See Borodkin, supra note 2, at 382.
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mented. Once this article was published, however, scholars in the area
began to acknowledge the looting of antiquities as a problem.8
Today, international antiquities smuggling has become an epidemic
affecting every continent and virtually every nation. Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America have all felt the effects
of antiquities smuggling.9 In fact, in the Mediterranean, Turkey and Italy
have experienced the most severe problems." In Central and South
America, Mayan sculptures, as well as Pre-Columbian ceramics and Costa
Rican jade, have a history of heavy illegal traffic.1 Ethnographic and
primitive artifacts from Africa have also been desirable. 12 In addition, the
past few decades have shown a sharp growth in antiquities smuggling from
Southeast Asia, particularly India, Thailand, and Cambodia) 3 For example,
the United Nation's Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") "has estimated that more than 50,000 art objects have been
smuggled out of India in the last 10 years alone."
14
B. Antiquities
To understand the mechanics of looting, the first step is to define the
term antiquity, a task easier said than done. Foremost, many different terms,
such as artifact, cultural property, and archeological resources are readily found in
literature and legal writings when referring to antiquities. Accordingly, the
meanings of these words are broad and expansive. For this reason, both
statutory law and case law have demonstrated great disparity in their defini-
tions of antiquity. The United States defines an "archeological resource" as
"any material remains of past human life or activities which are of archeo-
logical interest." 5 The definition requires that such artifacts be at least one
hundred years of age, and its scope includes but is not limited to "pottery,
basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools, structures or any por-
tion of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings, intaglios, graves,
human skeletal materials, or any portion or piece of any of the foregoing
8 See id.
9 Id.
10 Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275,292 (1982).
it Id. at 292-93.
12 Id. at 293.
13 Id.
14 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 240.
is 16 U.S.C. 5 470bb(1) (1994).
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items." 6 This definition, however, is not the only acceptable one in the
United States.
An Indiana statute describes an "artifact" as "an object made or shaped
by human workmanship before December 11, 1816." 17 Virginia, on the
other hand, defines "an object of antiquity" as "any relic, artifact, remain,
including human skeletal remains, specimen, or other archeological article
that may be found in or below the surface of the earth which has historic,
scientific, archeological or educational value." 8 These are but two examples
of a variety of definitions used in federal and state law.
Thus, these varying definitions create a climate where no common
concrete definition ofa crime against antiquity may exist. This conundrum not
only facilitates looting, but it makes a systematic crackdown on antiquity
crimes impossible. For purposes of clarity this comment will utilize the
terms antiquity, artifact, and cultural property interchangeably to mean, in
general, an article representing the cultural heritage of a society.
The next step in understanding looting is to recognize why antiquities
are looted in the first place. Experts agree that antiquities are highly suscep-
tible to looting because artifacts are very valuable; antiquities trace the evolu-
tion of a people, and can be easily liquidated by selling to museums, auction
houses, and private collectors. 9 Such susceptibility can become even more
pronounced when the people of a country are in dire straits. This generally
happens in times of political unrest (whether colonial or foreign occupation
or war) or in times of poverty (whether in the wake of a natural disaster or
in developing countries).
One of the greatest examples of looting in the wake of political unrest
in the past century was Nazi Germany's pillaging of Europe during World
War II. In "the greatest mass theft in history," 20 Nazi soldiers took what has
been estimated to be hundreds of thousands of sculptures, drawings, and
paintings, as well as millions of antiquities, including books and religious
16 Id.
17 IND. CODE ANN. S 14-21-1-2 (Michie 1995).
18 VA. CODE ANN. S 10.1-2300 (Michie 1989).
19 See Predita C. Rostomian, Looted Art in the U.S. Market, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 271, 271-76
(2002).
20 Paulina McCarter Collins, Has the "Lost Museum" Been Found? Declassification of Government
Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to "DoJustie" ForHolocaust Victims on the Issue
of Nazi Looted Art?, 54 ME. L. REV. 115, 123 (quoting testimony from Stewart E. Eizenstat given during
congressional testimony before the House Banking Committee on September 14, 1999 in an update to
Congress on the work of the Holocaust Asset Commission).
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scrolls.2 The main motivation of the Nazis was to collect art in order for
Germany to become Europe's cultural hub.'
A more recent example of looting in times of political unrest may be
found in Iraq. There currently exists a breakdown in Iraqi social systems
and agencies, including the police service and the antiquities department.
This collapse has facilitated numerous antiquity lootings, primarily in the
countryside. For example, a report in 2003 described systematic looting by
a gang of over 300 men who were then digging in the Sumerian City of
Umma for artifacts. 3
Political unrest is not the only social consequence that may heighten
illicit antiquity loss. Poverty may have a similar effect. Increased looting has
been well documented after natural disasters leave individuals homeless and
penniless. For example, after a severe earthquake in 1976, many Guatema-
lans were left impoverished. Experts believe it was at this time that the poor
first began stealing precious icons (some valued at over $100,000) and Pre-
Columbian pieces (with a greater demand and valued even higher than the
icons) out of desperation for money. From this dire situation of the late
1970s, a thriving black market was born in Guatemala that continues to play
a role in illicit art trade today.24
General poverty is another situation where the value of antiquities is
exploited. Antiquities are heavily looted in these developing countries which
are often poor and in the process of developing; these countries are also
known as "artifact-rich" or "source" nations.' When a country is barely
holding itself together socially, politically, and economically,26 two main
conditions systematically follow. First, citizens are destitute and will do
desperate acts to supplement meager incomes or, in some cases, to create
incomes where none exist. Second, with few resources, successful law
enforcement against looters and thieves is difficult to achieve.' It is unlikely
that resources will be allocated to the patrolling of archeological sites when
killing and other more dangerous felonies are taking place within a country's
borders.
28
21 Rostomian, supra note 19, at 273-74.
2 ld. at 273.
23 Nick Grimm, Systetnatic Looting ofAntiquities in Iraq, (May 22, 2003), at http.'/www.abc.net.au/
worldtoday/content/2003/s861573.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
24 See Rostomian, supra note 19, at 275.
25 See Borodkin, supra note 2, at 385.
26 See CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 4.
27 See id. (explaining that Peru has a difficult time preventing looting of their antiquities because
the country is poor country and faces imminent threats from both terrorists and drug traffickers).
28 Rostomian, supra note 19, at 275.
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C. Operations
The process of looting antiquities is socially organized and requires a
"multi-layered network of ... [diggers], middlemen, and dealers."29 The
actual taking of antiquities is often carried out by local diggers, referred to
as either treasure hunters3" or grave robbers.31 The treasure hunters and
grave robbers view looting as a way to supplement their inadequate incomes
earned from their legitimate jobs and legal jobs.3 2 The challenge to these
individuals is locating the antiquities, but over time, these looters develop
tremendous knowledge of where to locate33 and how to value artifacts.34
Once they have found the artifacts, it is relatively easy to obtain them, as
archeological sites are often ill-protected or unknown to those outside of
archaeological circles.31 Ultimately, these individuals will sell their finds to
a middleman in hopes of liquidation.
The middleman, in turn, sells the artifacts to either local or foreign
dealers. A significant portion of the looted goods are smuggled out of the
country via planes, trains, automobiles, and boats, and into art collecting
countries, such as the United States, Switzerland, Germany, France, Japan,
and Hong Kong-making illicit antiquities trade truly international in
nature. 36 In fact, "[s] mugglers are said to come from all walks of life but are
often times journalists, art brokers, and even diplomats who take advantage
of the immunity from search given to diplomatic bags."37 Once abroad,
most artifacts are sold privately through dealers. This whole process occurs
on the black market. Yet, in the international art market there is a blurry
distinction between criminal activity and shrewd business dealings.
38
Looting and smuggling are easy to carry out due to the ambiguities of
passing title. Cases of stolen antiquities often hinge upon the issue of to
whom the artifact belongs, and, to this extent, there are categories of
potential owners: (1) the owner of the land on which the artifact was found,
29 See CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 13.
30 Id. at 158.
31 Id. at 161,163 (discussing Italian grave-robbers, known as tombaroli, and LatinAmerican grave-
robbers, called huaqueros).
32 Id. at 158-59.
33 See id. at 160 (discussing Turkish peasants who wait for the rain to uncover ancient tombs and
valuable objects).
34 Id. at 159.
35 Id. at 164.
36 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 236-37.
37 Id. at 241.
38 The fine line distinction between participation in reputable business dealings and illicit trade
is an important theme that should be kept firmly in mind throughout this comment.
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(2) the individual who unearths the artifact, or (3) the government. 9 In the
United States, the first of these arguments is the initial premise of property
law, but this premise is not unconditional. 4 Three factors are taken into
consideration when accessing title on objects found: location (private,
Native American Tribal, or public land), nature of the article found (charac-
teristics and intrinsic value of the article to society or the claimant, funerary
remains, fossils, and Civil War artifacts), and the claimant's relationship to
the article (landowner, prior owner, groups with attachments to artifacts,
state or federal government, and finder).41 Courts use these various charac-
teristics to determine property rights, but because there is no set formula
employed to weigh these variables, the issue of ownership is still muddled.42
Although some foreign countries have absolute laws defining property
rights of cultural items,43 many nations find themselves in an ambiguous
situation similar to that of the United States. For example, in Ireland, a case
arose in 1986 involving an eighteenth century chalice found on private
property by a trespasser who later sold the chalice to the National Museum
of Ireland. The issue before the High Court of Ireland was: who had title
to the chalice?" Arguments made by the various parties included: a claim
to title by the finder of the chalice, an argument by the landowner that the
finder was trespassing and committing larceny when the chalice was seized,
and a claim by the Museum that treasure troves belong to the state, a theory
borrowed from English law.45
Today, antiquities are generally thought of as "part of a nation's patri-
mony,"' not as the property of an individual. Thus, these items are not
exportable unless some form of "official approval" has been obtained.47 This
belief is solidified in the passage of laws in many countries defining artifacts
as property of the nation;48 this is particularly true of many African nations.49
Part III of this comment will explore national laws regarding international
art crimes in greater depth.
39 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 122.
40 See Zahra S. Karinshak, The Relics of the Past-To Whom Do They Belong? The Effect of an
Archeological Excavation on Property Rights, 46 EMoRY L.J. 867, 869 (1997).
41 Id. at 869-72.
42 Id. at 872.
43 For example, China declares all archeological material property of the state. GREENFIELD,
supra note 1, at 242.
44 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 122.
45 Id. at 122-23.
46 Id. at 122.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 158.
49 Id. at 260.
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D. Secondary Crimes
Often times, in order to steal and smuggle antiquities, looters must
deface antiquities in order to ease transportation or make the object unrecog-
nizable to law enforcement officials. This need for disguise leads to the
further crime of vandalism. Tufts University Professor and criminology
author John Conklin defines art vandalism as "the intentional or negligent
destruction of a work of art."' In their haste to gather antiquities, looters do
not use the most careful method of excavating as would archeologists, and,
therefore, looters frequently destroy or damage ancient objects. For
example, Pre-Columbian monuments in Guatemala and Mexico, often
weighing five tons or more, are hacked, sawed, and smashed into smaller
pieces by looters in order to facilitate movement." In order to pass by
customs officials, smugglers often break up articles and destroy or discard
material because it may make their crime apparent to experts. For example,
an ancient Greek vase acquired by the Metropolitan Maseum of Art in 1972
was said to have been "expertly broken into small pieces for illegal export"
and then reassembled after successfully being smuggled out of the source
52nation.
After the artifact is initially looted, perhaps vandalized, and sold to a
buyer (private collector, museum, or gallery) via the black market, the arti-
fact may be stolen, essentially for a second time, from the buyer. Thieves
obtain illicit artifacts in several ways resulting in a variety of crimes. Some
thieves simply take an object from a museum, gallery, church or house
without force or illegal entry. This crime is larceny. 3 Others commit a
burglary by breaking and entering into a building and then stealing the
artifact. Finally, a thief may use force or the threat of force against people
who own or guard artifacts before stealing in a robbery. 4
11I. REGULATION
The first documentation of cultural property regulation was in 1464
when Pope Pius II prohibited the exportation of works of art from the
Vatican and restricted archeological excavations.55 Unfortunately, regulation
has always been particularly difficult to execute successfully. After
Napoleon's plunder of England and the Battle at Waterloo, the English
5o CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 227.
51 Id. at 228-29.
52 Id. at 252.
53 Id. at 153-54.
54 Id. at 154.
55 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 232.
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demanded restitution for cultural objects taken. 6 The French were "fiercely
opposed to this restitution."5 7 The Louvre director, who had been respon-
sible for shaping much of the museum's collections, made his opposition
particularly well known." Although the program did restore many stolen
treasures, many valuable works had already been dispersed around the world
and sold, forever severing them from their country of origin. Still "other
items were impossible to return because they had actually been incorporated
into other structures, such as the marble pillars from the cathedral ofAachen
which had been incorporated into the Louvre."5 9
This part of the comment first surveys various import/export and resti-
tution regulations along with enforcement bodies adopted by the inter-
national community. Second, regulations and enforcement of individual
nations, with a primary focus on the United States, are reviewed especially
where such measures are deficient, because shortcomings essentially render
illicit traffic permissible. Third, conflicts between international and national
regulations as well as laws of different nations are explored. The intersection
of international and national measures is of central importance in controlling
black market antiquities trade; however, when intersection nets out potential
effectiveness, a successful crackdown on black market antiquities trade is
impeded.
A. International Response
The first international response to the looting of antiquities to gain
worldwide acceptance came in 1970 when UNESCO held the Convention
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property ("Convention").6' The goal of
this Convention was to protect the cultural property of countries against
"theft, pillage or misappropriation,"'61 as well as to provide for the requisition
of such property in times of war and peace.62 The reason for protecting this
property is found in the fact that "cultural property constitutes one of the
basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can





6 UNESCO Website, Prevention of the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property, at http://www.unesco.org/cultureAegalprotection/theft/htmleng/index-en.shtml (last visited
Jan. 21, 2005).
61 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 216.
6 Id. at 216-17.
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its origin, history, and traditional setting."63 When antiquities are moved
illegally, much valuable information regarding the object is lost forever. The
purpose of the Convention was to preserve this priceless information by
lessening the ease with which antiquity thieves can liquidate antiquities. If
thieves cannot export and import artifacts to exchange their takings for
money, the incentive for looters in taking artifacts in the first place will be
significantly lessened.
The Convention lays out a multi-pronged plan. The General Assembly
of all signatories to the Convention first selects which members will com-
pose the World Heritage Committee, a group of twenty-one signatory
states.' This decision-making committee determines what cultural property
is "important for [a country's] archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art
or science," and designates this property as protected. 65 Next, each signatory
implements special services to protect their designated cultural property,
drafts laws against illicit import and export, establishes inventories of their
nationally protected property, and promotes the principles of the Conven-
tion to museums, libraries, archives, and laboratories in order to ensure the
preservation and presentation of cultural property.' The Convention
acquires legal status only after it is signed by a nation.67 As of May 1, 2004,
178 nations had signed the Convention.68 Many of the signatories are Third
World countries and source nations, 69 but large art importing nations such
as Canada, France, the United States,70 Switzerland, and Germany have also
signed.7
63 Harrie Leyten, Illicit Traffic in Collections of Western Museums of Ethnography, in ILLICIT TRAFFIC
IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 14, 18 (Harrie Leyten ed., 1995) (quoting the
1970 UNESCO Convention). See also UNESCO Website, 30th Anniversary of UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,
at httpV/www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2000/00-116e.shtml (last visited February 4, 2005).
64 UNESCO Website, World Heritage Committee, at http://whc.unesco.org/committ.htm (last
visited February 22, 2005).
65 UNESCO Website, 30th Anniversary of UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, at http://www.unesco.org/
bpi/eng/unescopress/2000/00-116e.shtml (last visited February 4, 2005).
66 Leyten, supra note 63, at 18 (quoting the 1970 UNESCO Convention).
67 Id. at 19.
68 World Heritage Website, States Parties, at http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=246 (last visited
February 22, 2005).
69 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 280.
70 Howard N. Spiegler & Lawrence M. Kaye, American Litigation to Recover Cultural Property:
Obstacles, Options, and a Proposal, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
WORLD'S ARCHEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 121, 125 (Neil Brodie, Jennifer Doole & Colin Renfrew eds.,
2001). See also World Heritage Website, States Parties, at http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=246 (last
visited February 22, 2005).
71 World Heritage Website, States Parties, at http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=246 (last visited
February 22, 2005).
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Particularly important to the Convention is Article 7, which provides for
the restitution of cultural objects.72 Import and export regulation attack
illicit art trade as artifacts are being exported out of the source nation and
into a new country, whereas restitution provides a remedy (return to the
rightful owner) once the objects have already crossed borders. Import and
export regulations alone will not curb illegal art trade effectively. Countries
must implement import and export regulations along with a provision for
the restitution of cultural objects. Thus, a provision like Article 7 completes
the Convention's multi-pronged plan. Nevertheless, Article 7 creates no
official international tribunal to handle disputes between parties over
restitution, and instead leaves this responsibility to the individual states.73 In
theory, such disputes could go before the International Court ofJustice in
The Hague, but there are many difficulties with this, and restitution is not
likely to follow. 74 Critics view this shortcoming as a major weakness to the
Convention 7' because laws attempting to curb illicit antiquities trade are
only as strong as the mechanism in place to uphold the law. Here the
mechanism is missing.
Additional criticisms of the Convention are numerous. First, most of
the signatory nations only agreed to its conditions in limited ways.76 This
circumstance tends to water down the ideas of the Convention and makes
its pursuit of objectives less vigorous. Second, the Convention itself is
restricted only to artifacts stolen from museums, public monuments, and
similar institutions. 7 Therefore, antiquities yet to be unearthed and artifacts
which are unearthed but held by private individuals are effectively excluded
from the Convention. Third, there is a disconnection between definitions
of important terminology. For example, each signatory is allowed to "define
the cultural property that is to be protected."78 Finally, the term "owner in
good faith" is never defined by the Convention, leaving interpretation up to
the individual member countries. Without harmonization of important
nomenclature and some level of unification in the way such terminology is
interpreted, the possibility of curbing illicit trade does not exist.
79
72 Sabine Gimbrere, Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property and National and International Law, in ILLICIT
TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 53, 54 (Harrie Leyten ed., 1995).
73 Id.
74 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 258.
75 Girnbrere, supra note 72, at 54.
76 Spiegler & Kaye, supra note 70, at 125.
7n GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 258. See also Gimbrere, supra note 72, at 55.
78 Michael Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the Flourishing International Trade of Art and Antiquities:
Restitutio in Integrum and Possessio animo Ferundi/Lucrandi, DiCK. J. INT'L L. 31, 44 (1995).
79 See Gimbrere, supra note 72, at 55.
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In light of such problems, UNESCO approached the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law ("UNIDROIT") to help it
improve the recovery of stolen and otherwise illegally removed cultural
artifacts.80 InJune 1995, UNIDROIT completed a treaty that would greatly
expand protection of cultural entities. The treaty, however, is not retroactive
and does not apply to pieces stolen from the host country before its ratifica-
tion."l Currently, twenty-two countries have signed the treaty, eleven of
which have ratified it,' and thirteen countries have acceded to it.83 The
majority of the countries which have signed the treaty are source nations.
Many market nations, including the United States, have yet to sign. 4 One
reason market nations, particularly the United States, are apprehensive to
sign is due to the negative response from art dealers. These dealers are con-
cerned that they will no longer be able to exhibit or sell pieces in countries
that have ratified the treaty because the source nations may be able to legally
confiscate their artifacts.'5
In addition to UNIDROIT, several international, nongovernmental
bodies have been established to help counter difficulties faced by
UNESCO.86 The two main organizations which focus on these efforts are
INTERPOL and the International Council of Museums ("ICOM").
INTERPOL, headquartered in Lyon, France,g7 is the organization actually
charged with patrolling the illicit traffic ofantiquities.' Created "to facilitate
cross-border criminal police cooperation, "9 INTERPOL focuses on provid-
ing reliable communication to police around the globe in order to ease
80 Id.
81 C. Noonan &J. Raskin, Intellectual Property Crimes, 38(3) AM. CRIM. L. REV. 971,1016 (2001).
82 UNIDROIT Website, Status Report: UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or llegally Exported Cultural
Objects (June 6,1995, updated 2004), at http;//www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005).
83 UNIDROIT Website, Status Report: UNlDROIT Convention on Stolen orluegauy Exported Cultural
Objects (June 6, 1995, updated 2004), at http,//www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005).
8 UNIDROITWebsite, Status Report: UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or llegally Exported Cultural
Objects Uune 6,1995, updated 2004), at http;//www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005).
85 Noonan & Raskin, supra note 81, at 1016.
96 See, e.g., Elizabeth des Portes, The Fight Against Illicit Traffic in Cultural Property: a Priority for
Museum Professionals, in ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL PROPERTY: MUSEUMS AGAINST PILLAGE 34,35
(Harrie Leyten ed., 1995).
87 INTERPOL Website, 11 September Task Force at Interpol Headquarters (Sept. 14, 2001), at
httpV/www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2001/PR200119.asp (last visitedJan. 27, 2005).
8 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 244.
89 INTERPOL Website, Introduction to Interpol, at http'/www.interpol.com/Public/Icpo/
introduction.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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information transmission on stolen property and wanted suspects. In
addition, it coordinates international investigations.9°
Specifically, INTERPOL's stolen art unit keeps track of all notices of
major art thefts.91 Notices include date and place of theft, description of the
work, a photograph, and details of local authorities to contact with informa-
tion.92 INTERPOL then sends this information to all relevant agencies such
as law enforcement and customs. These agencies are responsible for circu-
lating the information to other members of the art industry.
93
INTERPOL faces a multitude of difficulties in accomplishing its
mission. First, INTERPOL has other responsibilities. Because there are
other pressing international crimes aside from art crimes,' valuable
resources and manpower must be shared. Thus, art theft, and subsequently
antiquity theft, is not a top priority. Second, in order for INTERPOL to get
involved, the theft must involve the artifact being transported across national
borders.9 Third, the majority of information submitted to INTERPOL on
art thefts and losses of cultural property comes from an array of geographi-
cally and culturally disperse nations, not from a single source or area. This
factor, in effect, causes fluctuation in the volume of art and cultural property
crimes reported by various countries. For example, in 1999, Jean-Pierre
Jouanny of INTERPOL stated that close to 6,000 art thefts were reported in
France, the location of INTERPOL's headquarters, whereas only 2,000
reports each from Russia, Germany, the Czech Republic, and Italy. Due in
part to the modernization in transportation and communications, non-
French reports were up from previous years.96 Still, fewer than 100 tips per
year are received from non-European nations. 9' Fourth, the agency has
been criticized for being slow to disseminate information on thefts, failing
to update records, and keeping incomplete records.
98
Unlike INTERPOL, ICOM has targeted the problem of illicit antiqui-
ties trade by applying pressure on museums to promote professional ethics
internally.99 "ICOM is an international organization of museums and
90 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 244.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 245.
93 Id. at 244-45.
94 Id. at 245.
95 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 5.
9 UNESCO Website, Launch of Code ofEthicsforA rt Dealers atAnniversary Celebration of Convention
on Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (Nov. 16,2000), at http//:www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2000/00-119e.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
97 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 245.
98 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 5.
99 Cf. des Portes, supra note 86, at 35.
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museum professionals which is committed to the conservation, continua-
tion, and communication to society of the world's natural and cultural
heritage, present and future, tangible and intangible."'O° The French-based
council'"' seeks to carry out this objective in three ways. First, ICOM
provides guidelines for the training of museum personnel. Second, it helps
museums improve their security by establishing inventories.' °2 The inven-
tory index is extremely useful in museum security as it can prove a
museum's ownership of an object and aid in the object's identification.
ICOM has established a committee, the International Committee for Docu-
mentation ("ICDOC"), which aids various museums in setting up these
inventories. Third, ICOM published a Professional Code of Ethics'03
("ICOM Code") consisting of twenty recommendations and ethical prin-
ciples to govern museums and museum professionals" and established a
committee to police museums' adherence to the ICOM Code.'0 5
Of particular importance in the ICOM Code is its policy outlining the
procedures that museum professionals must follow when acquiring a new
piece of art. This policy states that museums shall acquire pieces only in
cooperation with and in observance of the laws of the source nation.1
0 6
Ramifications of the acquisition policy have been felt by museums in
Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.0 7
Communication with the international art community is of the utmost
importance in curbing illicit art trade, and, thus, it is a central tenant to
ICOM. For this reason, ICOM holds workshops around the world aimed
at educating antiquity professionals. Past workshops have been held in
Thailand, Cambodia, Hungary, Tanzania, and Western Africa.'08 ICOM
also publishes a quarterly bulletin which is distributed to its thirteen thou-
sand members in one hundred forty-five countries."°° These bulletins
announce missing objects that have been reported to INTERPOL and, in
too ICOM Website, What is ICOM, at http//icom.museum/organization.html (last updated Jan.
27, 2005).
101 ICOM Website, What is ICOM, at http'//icom.museum/organization.html (last updatedJan.
27, 2005).
102 des Portes, supra note 86, at 35. See also GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 244.
103 des Portes, supra note 86, at 35 (stating that the ICOM Code was first published in 1986).
104 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 245. See also des Portes, supra note 86, at 35.
105 des Portes, supra note 86, at 35 (stating that the committee was established in 1989).
106 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 244.
107 Id.
108 des Portes, supra note 86, at 37-38.
109 ICOM Website, ICOM News Thematic Files, at http'//icom.museum/thematic.html (last
updated Aug. 5, 2004).
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the past, have assisted in the location and restitution of several antiquities,
such as Japanese objects stolen from a museum in Israel and a bronze head
stolen from the Nigerian National Museum.' Stemming from the success
of the bulletin, ICOM created a publication entitled "A Hundred Missing
Objects." The first edition featured items from a Cambodian site in Ankor
which were recently the subject of systematic pillaging.' Immediately after
the series went to publication, one of the featured objects was found with a
Parisian antique dealer and was successfully returned to Cambodia."2
B. National Regulation
Today, many countries impose at least some type of restriction on the
import and export of cultural property and may even have adopted a restitu-
tion provision. 113 These regulations seldom extend regulation to articles less
than fifty or one hundred years old." 4 In addition, various countries impose
different types and levels of regulation. Differing national legal controls on
the illicit traffic of cultural property create considerable problems for cohe-
sive multi-national regulation.
Regulations generally fall into four categories. The first category,
adopted by much of Latin America for its Pre-Columbian and colonial art-
works, is total prohibition of export." s Turkey and Zaire also place an
embargo against the export of cultural matter. 116 The second category is
total prohibition of specific items which are listed as being of great cultural
importance. Most nations in the world, such as France, Italy,"7 India, and
Japan," 8 adopt this approach," 9 but these lists vary from general to specific.
For example, extremely exhaustive lists have been crafted by the Ivory Coast,
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka. 20 Most European nations and
countries such as Camaroon, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mali, Niger, and
Senegal, have drafted more general lists of objects subject to export
110 des Portes, supra note 86, at 37.
Ill Id.
112 Id.
113 Leyten, supra note 63, at 19.
114 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, lAW, ETHICS AND THE VIsuAL ARTS 70 (3d
ed. 1998).
115 Id.
116 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 242.
117 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 114, at 70.
118 GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 242.
119 Id.
120 Leyten, supra note 63, at 19-20.
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control. 121 Other countries including, Thailand and Papua New Guinea,
give very brief descriptions, such as "any object of art, registered or not." "
Most of these nations also require a permit for the export of non-listed
works. This process involves delay, and is therefore burdensome and unde-
pendable.
23
The third category of regulations exists in counties such as Canada and
United Kingdom, where export permits are required for broad classes of
items, but are generally easy to obtain without significant expense or delay. 124
Switzerland falls in the fourth category which consists of countries with no
export restrictions. Although the United States fell into the aforementioned
category at one time, it now limits the export of cultural artifacts.1"
Historically the United States has maintained a laissez-faire mentality
with regards to cultural property. 1 6 This is likely due to the fact that the
United States is one of the "largest buyer's market in the world " 127 when it
comes to artifacts obtained on the black market.2 In many situations the
illegally exported property finds its way to respectable museums and auction
houses. In the early 1970s, this laissez-faire mentality began to shift for two
reasons: (1) art museums began to adopt "self-restraint" resolutions in their
collection policies,"2 and (2) the passage of the Pre-Columbian Monu-
mental Sculpture and Murals Statute.130
After several art museums, such as those at the University of
Pennsylvania and Harvard University, decided to stop purchase artworks
without information regarding prior ownership, place of origin, and export
documents, the American Association of Museums ("AAM") began to urge
its members to abstain from purchasing or accepting donations of antiquities
that were exported in violation of the UNESCO Convention. In some
instances, museums voluntarily returned antiquities that had been previously
illegally exported from their country oforigin. In other situations, museums
were forced by the United States government to return such works.
131
The Pre-Columbian Monumental Sculpture and Murals Statute (the
"Act") is a unique statute that prohibits the import of large stone pieces of
121 Id. at 19.
122 Id. at 19-20.
123 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 114, at 70.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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Pre-Columbian temples and murals into the United States 32 and provides
for the return of certain Pre-Columbian art to the country of origin.' 33 The
Act requires that an importer of Pre-Columbian monumental or architec-
tural sculptures, murals, or fragments present proof regarding its legal expor-
tation from the country of origin. If the importer cannot present such
certificate of proof, the artifacts are forfeited to the United States govern-
ment and remain in the government's possession until the country of origin
requests their return."3 Nonetheless, this legislation presents one main
weakness: these artifacts are only in violation of the Act if the item was
exported on or before October 27, 1972.135
In 1983136 the United States took another step toward the prevention of
illicit antiquity circulation by implementing the UNESCO Convention
through the Cultural Property Implementation Act ("CPIA).137 The CPIA
allows the United States to impose antiquity importation restrictions
through the use of both bilateral and multilateral agreements.138 In addition,
the CPIA has an emergency provision under which the United States may
restrict the importation of artifacts shown to be "in jeopardy from pillaging,
dismantling, dispersal or fragmentation which is, or threatens to be of crisis
proportions," even where no previous agreement exists. 139 Under the CPIA,
if an antiquity enters the United States without documentation, and it is the
subject of a bilateral or multilateral agreement or an emergency decree, the
article risks seizure and forfeiture."
The CPIA was first invoked in 1987 via an emergency decree to ban
imports of artifacts from the Cara Sucia region of El Salvador. 4' It was not
until several years later, in 1995, that the first bilateral agreement was
signed. 42 Since then, the United States has entered into agreements with
several countries including El Salvador, Peru, Canada, and Italy.' 43
132 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 252.
133 GRENFIELD, supra note 1, at 243.
134 See 19 U.S.C. § 2092-2093 (1988).
135 Id.
136 United States State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Website,
Convention on Cultural Poprertylmplementation Aa, at http//exchanges.state.gov/culprop/97-446.html (last
visitedJan. 21, 2005). See also US Code, 19 USC S 2600, available at http//exchanges.state.gov/culprop/
2600.html (last visited February 22, 2005).
137 Spiegler & Kaye, supra note 70, at 125.
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The domestic body in the United States that patrols art theft is the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), which maintains and regularly
updates the National Stolen Art File ("NSAF") to record information about
stolen property. NSAF catalogs stolen art in great detail but is underused,
according to the Agency.'" Additionally, the FBI's jurisdiction of art thefts
is limited to investigations where stolen goods valued at more than $5,000
have been transported across state boundaries.14
C. Conflicts in Regulation
It is clear that international and national regulations of cultural property
are sometimes flawed internally and are not always effective. These initial
problems are further exacerbated when international and national laws
conflict and where regulations of different countries are inconsistent.
National legislation regarding the illicit trade of cultural property is
essential even where international regulation exists. For, without national
support, any international attempts at controlling the problem of illicit trade
are null and void. If, however, international and national legislations are not
well coordinated, it is possible for an international regulation to actually
limit the effectiveness of a national regulation. Such was the case in the 1983
Canadian situation involving the Nigerian Nok terracotta."4 Canada had
imposed a series of regulations for the restitution of illegally exported cul-
tural property; however, because Canada was a signatory to the 1970
UNESCO Convention, Canada was unable to prove the terracotta was
exported after the current restitution law was in place. 47 Therefore, the
cultural object did not have to be returned. This was the situation in the
Nigerian Nok case, as the terracotta was never in fact returned.
48
Similar problems can arise between laws of different nations. The
nature of the black art market entails the passage of art through many hands
scattered around the globe. This situation, compounded with the fact that
countries choose to regulate illicit art trade in different ways, yield many
instances where choice of law issues arise. In Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church v. Goldberg,'49 a 1989 case tried before a Federal District Court in
144 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 5.
145 Id.
146 See GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 243.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Folarin Shyllon, The Recovery of Cultural Objects by African States through the UNESCO
and UNIDROIT Conventions and the Role of Arbitration, at httpV/www.unidroit.org/english/publications/
review/articles/2000-2a.htm (last visited November 21, 2003).
149 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (S.D. Ind. 1989), rehearing denied, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 502 U.S. 941,petition for rehearing denied, 502 U.S. 1050.
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Indiana, one of the prevailing issues was what country's restitution laws
should be applied."0
The case centered on a sixth century Byzantine mosaic. In 1979, the
mosaic was stolen from a Greek church in Lythrankomi, Cyprus, an area
under Turkish sovereign.' In the summer of 1988, an art dealer incor-
porated under the laws of Indiana ("Goldberg") traveled to Amsterdam to
shop for art. 2 Once there, she met up with a friend from Indiana
("Friend"), who introduced her to a Dutch art dealer ("Dutch Dealer")." 3
Dutch Dealer told her of the mosaic, and referred her to a Turkish
antiquities dealer in Munich ("Munich Dealer") who was in possession of
the piece. 54 After obtaining a loan through her bank in Indiana, Goldberg
met Munich Dealer in the Geneva airport and exchanged $1,080,000 for the
mosaic.' The moneywas split between Dutch Dealer, Munich Dealer, and
Friend.156 Proceeds from Goldberg's re-sale of the mosaic were to be split
between Goldberg and the other three parties involved. 157 When Goldberg
attempted to sell the mosaic, the potential buyer discovered the mosaic was
stolen.' The Republic of Cyprus and Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox
Church of Cyprus brought an action for replevin.'59
The court narrowed the choice of law question down to three possible
locations: Germany (locus of the transaction), Switzerland (location of the
mosaic at the time of the transaction), or Indiana (place from which the
purchase was financed). The court ultimately applied Indiana law."6 This
case is a good illustration of how many actors of different nationalities may
be involved in a single art transaction, thus giving rise to choice of law
problems.
IV. ADDITIONAL FACTORS FACILITATING ILLICIT TRADE
There are several additional conditions of the international art market
that facilitate the ease of illicit antiquity trade. This part of the comment
begins by exploring the supply and demand for stolen antiquities in the art
1so See Borodkin, supra note 2, at 400.
151 Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1378.
152 Id. at 1381.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1382-83.
156 Id. at 1383.
157 Id. at 1384.
lSS Id.
159 Id. at 1375.
160 Borodkin, supra note 2, at 400.
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market. The part ends with an analysis of how legitimate art establishments
and actors, such as auction houses, dealers, collectors, and museums,
launder illicit antiquities and, therefore, facilitate the ease of committing
antiquity crimes.
A. Supply and Demand
The stolen art market is an industry estimated to be worth between two
and six billion dollars.'' Both supply and demand of cultural objects appear
to be increasing.
Four main factors contribute to growth in supply. First, there is
continued exploration and discovery ofarcheological sites.' 62 Such discovery
comes from both intentional and unintentional actors. Intentional actors
include archeologists working according to recognized standards and within
the official system, in addition to amateur archeologists and trophy hunters
who illegally engage in searching for cultural objects.' 63 Unintentional
actors include land cultivators, who discover antiquities while turning the
earth, and builders, who make such discoveries while excavating to build
roads and structures."
Second, this increase results from new objects and new categories of
objects becoming artifacts with the passage of time. According to art law
experts John Merryman and Albert Elsen:
books, maps, and public documents created for practical use become
historical artifacts as they age, and the same is true for many other
made objects: automobiles become vintage cars, stamps and coins
become collectors items, as do furniture, silver,jewelry, china, per-
fume bottles, clothing, musical instruments, scientific instruments,
weapons, comic books, fruit box labels, the list is endless.'65
161 Robert L. Moshman, Stolen Art, at http;//financialcounsel.com/Articles/EstatePianning/
ARTEST0000046-StolenArt.asp (last visited February 4,2005). See also David Holmstrom, Stolen-Art
Market Is a Big Business at $2 Billion A Year, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 11, 1994 at 1;
Borodkin, supra note 2, at 377-78; CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 4 (stating that, although hard to quantify,
the theft of art and antiquities was valued at a minimum of $1 billion in 1994, and there is reason to
believe this number has increased to the rapid rise in the price of art).





76 UNIVERSITYOFMIAMIBUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:55
The third factor, adding to the supply situation of illicit cultural prop-
erty, is the increase of artist and artisan activity."6 The fourth, and final
factor, is the desire of artifact-rich nations to export cultural property in
order to fund domestic growth. 6 Many artifact-rich nations have fragile
economies and few domestic products to export."6 Thus, their development
policies tend to encourage export of all types in order to produce revenue.'69
To accompany this increase in supply is a strong and continual demand
for quality works of art. Merryman and Elsen have correlated the increase
to several social factors. The first factor is extended life expectancy, 170 which
enables people to become more interested in collecting as a hobby because
of increased discretionary incomes and leisure time.'17 Hence, new private
collections are constantly being assembled. Second, levels of education are
increasing. 172 More people are interested in learning about human history,
and this interest increases museum and galleryvisits. 173 As more people visit,
more institutions open. 74
In discussing demand, it is important to note the sharp contrast between
artifact-rich countries and artifact-poor countries. The latter are without
much archeological wealth but nevertheless desire antiquities. They are the
countries providing the demand in the stolen antiquities market. Without
such demand, the market would be disabled. 175 It has been suggested by
some scholars that the distinction between these two types of countries is
becoming blurred as many nations today are both recipients and victims of
illegal export.'76 However, the fact that the bifurcation is evident in the
UNESCO Convention-through its reference to "source" and "market"
nations -- suggests that the distinction is still noteworthy.
The fundamentals of economics dictate that a market cannot exist with-
out both supply and demand. As supply and demand of cultural objects
increase, the stolen art market is not only facilitated but actually grows.
166 Id.
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B. Legitimate Art Market
So far this comment has allocated blame for the continued trade of illicit
antiquities on the valuable nature of antiquities, difficult social circum-
stances, inadequate regulation, and surging supply and demand. The legiti-
mate art market, however, also contributes significantly to the illicit trade of
art. The market fails to exercise due diligence when inquiring into an
artifact's chain of ownership. This part of the comment analyzes how
auction houses, art dealers, collectors, and museums effectively launder
illicitly traded cultural property. This process makes a once-illicit antiquity
valid, and even respectable, by affiliating the property, via either ownership
or consignment, with an established art institution.
The first actor to be analyzed is the auction house. There are many
instances of even the most prominent and reputable art houses cooperating
with the black art market to obtain art and antiquities. Thomas Hoving, a
former director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, has
stated that shady business dealings have plagued Sotheby's for years.
78
Further, Hoving states that auction houses have a first hand knowledge
regarding:
how antiquities smuggled out of Turkey and Sicily are laundered in
Switzerland and England and how false provenances are manufac-
tured and how the goods are stored in warehouses owned by auction
houses until statutes of limitations run out ... and how bids are
really rigged .... And how some auction houses once took pride in
being able for a fee to have any work smuggled out of Italy or other
countries. And how a bunch of furniture fakes were mysteriously
sold as genuine despite the sharp eyes of auction professionals.
7 9
One of the most questionable practices amongst auction houses is the
manner in which they query into an artifact's provenance. Linda Pinkerton,
former Vice President of Christie's, admits that tracing the history of every
object would be impossible due to high volumes of trade within auction
houses. 8° Yet, the real truth is that auction houses do not even make an
178 Tomas Hoving, My Eye. Artnet.com Magazine, February 28,2000, at http'//www.armet.com/
magazine/features/hoving/hoving2-28-00.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
179 Tomas Hoving, My Eye. Artnet.eom Magazine, February 28,2000, at httpV/www.artnet.com/
magazine/features/hoving/hoving2-28-00.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
180 Rostomian, supra note 19, at 287 (quoting and paraphrasing Linda Pinkerton, Museums Can
Do Better: Acquisition Policies Concerning Stolen and illegally ExporedAn, 5 VILL. SPORTS &ENT. L.J. 59, 60
(1998)).
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attempt to inquire into an object's origin. For example, a teenager once con-
signed several paintings and decorative objects stolen from a Pennsylvania
museum to a New York auction house claiming to have inherited them.181
The teenager was delighted with the ease with which he liquidated the
objects: "[the auction houses] don't ask you any questions about who you
are or where you got the paintings. ' 82
Actually, it is advantageous for an auction house to ask as few questions
as possible because the law effectively discourages an auction house from
inquiring into a piece's history. According to Pinkerton, "the less a dealer
knows about [a work's] past, the better" as he does not have to disclose the
unsavory past of the item, and possibly commit a crime himself, if he does
not have the requisite knowledge."a Some auction house executives
disagree, stating that documenting an artifact's country oforigin dramatically
increases the marketability and value of a piece.'" Yet, between 85% and
90% of antiquities appearing in auction house catalogs do not have infor-
mation regarding their country of origin.'85 This suggests that a failure to
publish the country of origin indicates some illegality in the history of the
antiquity.186 Most auction house executives agree that they are not liable for
illicit trade in art done through their establishments because the auction
house merely handles and sells the object for the owner and has no actual
property interest in the items they sell."s
Aiding in an auction house's ability to facilitate illegal art trade is the fact
that auction houses have historically been subject to relatively few legal
controls. This has been a great problem, particularly in England and
Switzerland. 8 8 The major auction houses in London have historically
needed only to determine that the seller is the bonafide owner of the
piece. 18 9 Investigation of ownership is difficult, and the English houses have
not been required to guarantee title or examine origin.19 Further, English
181 CONKLIN, supra note 3, at 141.
182 Id.
183 Rostomian, supra note 19, at 287 (quoting and paraphrasing Pinkerton, supra note 180, at 60).
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Return and Illicit Trade, Vol. I (July 24, 2000), at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/
cmselect/cmcumeds/cmcumeds.htm (last visited February 22, 2005).
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houses have traditionally included an exclusionary clause regarding authen-
ticity and authorship in their sales contract. Thus, it has been virtually
impossible to obtain and return illegally exported items appearing in auction
showrooms.1 91
The smaller auction houses of Switzerland have contributed greatly to
illegal art trade as well. According to the Bureau of Cultural Heritage in
Switzerland, the country's lack of restriction on the import and export of art
treasures has tremendously affected illicit art; Switzerland is the center of
stolen art from Italy, Greece, Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt.192
Both England and Switzerland have recently acceded to the UNESCO
Convention, in February of2003'93 andJune 200319' respectively. Since this
accession is so recent, it is difficult to evaluate the impact the passage of the
Convention has had in general, let alone amongst the auction houses in
these countries.
Auction houses in France, on the other hand, are subject to much more
stringent rules regarding guarantees of title. However, because the French
auction system is very fragmented-its catalogs are poorly organized, vague,
and distributed only locally-the detection of stolen art is unlikely.19
In the United States, auction houses are not well regulated at the federal
or state levels."9 First, auctioneers are provided with no guidelines. Auctio-
neers are not required to complete any professional training, nor are there
any necessary qualifications for an auctioneer in the area of appraisal." Yet,
many auctioneers offer opinions of authenticity and estimations of value."
It has been suggested that "because states do not license auctioneers, or
regulate auctions," anyone can enter into the auction business,99 even those
devoid of scruples.
Second, warranties of authenticity and title may be disclaimed. Under
the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") a warranty of authenticity of
191 Id.
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authorship can be disclaimed." Auction houses often invoke this disclaimer
to limit the possibility of auction purchasers rescinding a purchase once they
discover authorship is not authentic.20' Under the UCC, however,
affirmative statements of fact about goods to be auctioned can infer a
warranty.2 2 Several states, such as Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and NewYork,
have exceeded the protections provided by the UCC by enacting laws that
provide assurance of authenticity.' Under these laws, a non-merchant
buyer may have a liability action against the auction house where the auctio-
neer has made any statement regarding authorship, excluding statements
made that merely reflect the opinion of the auctioneer.2"
When it comes to warranties of title, the UCC is more rigorous. Under
the UCC, a seller is obligated to insure that both the title conveyed and the
transfer are rightful.2 s A disclaimer may only be made when the buyer has
reason to know that the person selling the work (not the auctioneer who
merely acts as a consignor) does not have rightful title himself.20 6 Such
disclaimers are seldom used in the auctioning of antiquities.2 °s
The second legitimate member of the art market to examine is the art
dealer. In the world of illicit art trade, dealers effectively become risk
absorbers, for a purchaser at an auction is only entitled to the title an auction
house has acquired. Any deficiencies in the trade process, up to the point
where the dealer acquires an artifact, are passed onto the dealer.
208
A bona fide art dealer will make several inquires upon buying.209 The
dealer will begin by questioning if the price reflects the piece's quality.210
Then, the dealer will query if the seller is bona fide.2 ' This is often difficult
to determine, and intuition is usually the best guidance. If a dealer uses a
seller or auction house frequently, a relationship and level of dependability
and credibility will be established. 21 2 Next, the dealer will question whether
the piece was forged and if it has been legally acquired from the point of
200 See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2003).
201 Stuart, supra note 197, at 74.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 78.
2W Id. at 78.
205 Id. at 75. See also U.C.C. S 2-312(2) (2003).
W6 Stuart, supra note 197, at 75. See also U.C.C. S 2-312(2) (2003).
207 Stuart, supra note 197, at 75.
208 Borodkin, supra note 2, at 386-87.
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origin. The element of origin is particularly important yet difficult to deter-
mine.213 For even where the item's country of origin is correctly communi-
cated, dealers are rarely aware of the import and export laws specific to that
country. It is easy to see how ignorance may make dealers an easy target in
the laundering of illegitimate antiquities.
The art dealer is in an extremely difficult position because the dealer
walks a fine line between making a profit, protecting-himselfagainst unfore-
seen circumstances, 2" and recognizing a new growing concern amongst
dealers over the destruction of cultural heritage.215 The need to develop and
maintain a reputation of integrity is also a necessity, and has driven many
dealers to adopt self-restraint policies and join dealer organizations touting
codes of ethics.216 For example, the English Code of Practice for the
Control of International Trading in Works of Art has a growing membership
and has been translated into and adopted by the French .2 " Additionally, the
International Association of Dealers in Ancient Art ("IADAA") has adopted
a Code of Ethics ("LADAA Code"). The IADAA Code reads:
[t]he members of the IADAA undertake to the best of their ability
to make their purchases in good faith; they undertake not to pur-
chase or sell objects until they have established to the best of their
ability that such objects were not stolen from excavations, architec-
tural monuments, public institutions, or private property.2 8
Although such codes aid in the fight against stolen antiquities, how
effective are they? Little data has been collected to answer this question.
Most importantly, none of these codes speak directly to illicit traffic (although
they do indirectly mention illicit trade). This reflects the complex nature of
the problem and difficulties posed when addressing it.
2 19
In recognition of unscrupulous art dealers and the problems in
addressing illicit art trade by the aforementioned codes, UNESCO launched
an International Code of Ethics for Dealers in Cultural Property ("Inter-
national Code") in November of 2000.220 Dealers who adopt the Inter-
213 Id. at 63.
214 Id.
215 Leyten, supra note 63, at 73.
216 See id. at 74.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 74.
220 UNESCO Website, Launch of Code ofEthicsforArtDeaersatAnniversary Celebration of Convention
on Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (Nov. 16,2000), at http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2 0 0 0/00-119e.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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national Code agree "not to trade in objects which might be stolen, clande-
stinely excavated, or illegally exported," and to cooperate in the return of
such objects.221 "The [International] Code was designed for those dealers
who wish to make clear that they use their best efforts to avoid any associa-
tion with illicit trade by checking carefully their sources of supply,"'m
declared Mounir Bouchenaki, UNESCO's Assistant Director-General for
Culture. Bouchenaki also added:
[t]he Code will be of use to dealers in any country who value their
reputation for integrity and wish to spell it out for their customers
to see .... It should encourage collectors to follow the ethics of the
International Council of Museums and to do their best to ensure
that they buy from sources who are meticulous in checking the
origin of the goods they offer to their customers. 
23
The main weakness in the International Code is that it is not mandatory for
dealers in countries that are Convention signatories. Therefore, dealers can
opt in or out of the provision to suit their own purposes.
Private collectors also make purchases at auctions; accordingly, they are
the third area of focus in understanding illicit trade. The law in the United
States imposes upon the buyer the duty of diligence, 24 which is a great
burden. The law requires the buyer to perform "requisite checking"225 to
discover if the item being bought has been legally obtained. 226 This check
sounds adequate, but two snags in the process exist. First, the potential
buyer need not learn the actual truth about the object, " which all but
nullifies the duty in the first place. Second, most buyers lack the sophis-
tication necessary to perform such an inquiry.22s For the most part, buyers
221 UNESCO Website, Launch ofCode fEthicsforArtDeaersatAnniversaryCelebration ofConvention
on Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (Nov. 16, 2000), at http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2000/00-119e.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
M UNESC0 Website, Launch ofCode ofEthicsfo rArtDealersatAnniversaryCeebratin ofCo nvention
on Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (Nov. 16,2000), at http'//www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2000/00-119e.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005) (quoting Mounir Bouchenaki, UNESCO's Assistant
Director General of Culture).
W UNESCO Website, Launch of CodeofEthicsforArtDeaersatAnniversary Celebration of Convention
on Ending Illicit Trade in Cultural Property (Nov. 16, 2000),at http//www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/
2000/00-119e.shtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).






are incapable of performing the requisite check.229 Thus, the collector, for
lack of correct knowledge and inability to execute a proper check, unknow-
ingly may contribute to the illicit antiquity trade.
Museums, the fourth and final area of interest in understanding how the
legitimate art market affects illicit trade, have a long history of supporting
and fostering the black market. Former museum director Hoving publicly
admitted that museum directors often purchase art and artifacts which they
have good reason to believe were stolen and smuggled illegally out of their
country of origin.3 ° Historically, museums have ignored the problem of
buying and possessing looted cultural artifacts.
The most prominent example of this followed World War II. After the
Holocaust, museums around the globe acquired a good number of stolen
pieces of art and antiquities that were looted during wartime. 2 1' But for
years, museums and collectors "seemed oblivious " 2 to the lasting effect this
would impose upon the acquisition process for pieces added since the war.33
Over the past decade, however, there has been an increase in attention to the
problem by the general public. In response, museums have grown more
concerned that pieces within their collections may be subject to claims from
original owners, 234 and initiated extensive research into the origins of
questionable pieces. 5 Yet, in 1998 when Congress considered legislation
to set standards for the return of Nazi looted art, museums were very much
opposed. 36  These actions seem to indicate reluctance on the part of
museums to return illicit pieces to their rightful owners.
A more recent example of a museum's possession of illicit artifacts
comes from the Lydian Hoard case.3 7 In the mid 1960s, over 360 Sixth
Century B.C. antiquities (including fragments of wall paintings, marble
sphinxes, vessels made of precious metals, and jewelry) were looted from a
series of tombs in the central part of Turkey. 238 This collection of artifacts,
named the Lydian Hoard, was then smuggled out of the country, and sold
229 Id.
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to New York art dealers. 9 Finally, the objects were purchased between
1966 and 1970 by New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art (the "Met").
240
Thomas Hoving now admits the museum knew from the beginning that
the Lydian Hoard consisted of looted artifacts. 241 The Met paid a reported
$1.2 million for the acquisition, and was aware at the time that the museum
might have to return the objects one day. 2 Because the Met feared the
discovery and potential loss of these artifacts, they remained in storage at the
museum for a number of years.243 In 1984, when the artifacts were finally
displayed, Turkish officials were notified.2" It seems the artifacts were
mislabeled as East Greek in origin in an attempt to disguise the collection.245
The Met refused to return the collection to Turkey for seven years until a
Federal District Court ruled the statute of limitations had not run and
Turkey was entitled to the artifacts.246 In 1993, the Met finally returned the
Lydian Hoard to Turkey.24
The museum's cavalier attitude towards the acquisition of the objects
and the subsequent loss of historical, cultural, and scientific information
seems shocking. Yet it is not unusual. 248 One author on the international
trade of art concluded that "America's museums have been partners of
thieves, smugglers, and unethical dealers and collectors.
249
Although the AAM, described above, has a Code of Ethics for Museums
("AAM Code") like the dealer codes previous to UNESCO, illicit trafficking
still is not adequately addressed. The AAM Code focuses on the fact that
museums are grounded in a tradition of public service and that their main
mission is to collect, preserve, and interpret the "things of this world."
25 °
Under the AAM Code's "Collections" provision, "public trust and responsi-
bility" are stressed.25' Additionally, the AAM Code requires the museum to
ensure that "acquisition, disposal, and loan activities are conducted in a
manner that respects the protection and preservation of natural and cultural
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 410.
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resources and discourages illicit trade in such materials., 252 This subtlety of
language in "discourag[ing] illicit trade,"5 3 with no further qualifications,
does not create an effective and straightforward method in addressing the
problem of museums legitimizing illicit antiquities.
V. CASE STUDY
To validate the claims of this comment and increase understanding, it
is useful to briefly examine a real world example. This part analyzes the
famous Elgin Marbles case and shows how the forces previously discussed
actually play out. First, an overview of the case is given, and then a survey
of how legitimate actors eased trade and facilitated the laundering of the
Elgin Marbles is provided.
In 1803, a large portion of a frieze located on the north, south, and east
sides of the Parthenon in Athens was dismantled and removed to England
by Lord Elgin.2' Lord Elgin, or Thomas Bruce as he was formerly known,
was the seventh Earl of Elgin, member of the House of Lords, and a career
diplomat. He was appointed by the King to serve as the British ambassador
to Turkey in the early 1800s. His objective was to participate in the expul-
sion of Napoleon while keeping friendly relations with the Turks. When
Lord Elgin noticed the unique friezes on the Acropolis he simply had to
have them.255  He immediately received permission from the Ottoman
Empire government. At first, his intentions were to take only impressions
of the friezes, 2 6 and reproduce the works for his new mansion in Scot-
land. 25" This ultimately turned into the destruction and outright looting of
the friezes.258
After an investigation by a British Parliamentary Select Committee in
1816, the government was sufficiently convinced that the acquisition by
Lord Elgin was legal and with the express permission from the then-govern-
ment of Greece.259 Following the conclusion of the Select Committee, the
Marbles were acquired by the Government of Great Britain for 35,000
pounds, and brought to the British Museum where they reside today.2 °
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The Elgin Marbles case could quite possibly be the most famous case of
looted antiquities in history. The great debate centers on whether Lord
Elgin rightfully took the Marbles, or whether he looted from the people of
Greece. 261 Recently, the 200-year-old debate took on a new twist and was
again in the spotlight-this time at the center of a campaign to have the
Marbles returned to Greece in time for the 2004 Olympics in Athens.262
Much to the dismay of Greece, the British Museum again refused to return
the Marbles in time for the Olympic games, and there is no indication that
this cultural controversy will be resolved anytime soon.2' In light of this,
and because a blurry distinction exists between the legitimate and illicit art
market, the comment will not strive to make conjectures on the debate, but
rather it will use this set of circumstances to provide a real world illustration
of how several of the factors discussed above (particularly political
circumstances, weak regulations, and lawful actors of the art market)
conspire together to ease illicit antiquities trade.
First, the Elgin Marbles case illustrates abuse of diplomatic position.
Although impoverished persons are often the ones who loot antiquities, it
is important to remember that looted objects are only valued when they can
be liquidated. And nations, or those acting with the power and influence of
a nation behind them, have historically participated in looting antiquities,
and cared little for cultural ramifications that may follow. 264 Scholars main-
tain that no private person could have removed such a massive and impor-
tant piece. "[I]t was the office of Lord Elgin that made his actions pos-
sible. 1265
Second, the Elgin Marbles debate illustrates the effect political unrest
has on illicit takings of antiquities. Elgin received permission from the
261 Id. at 84-85 (stating that in a 1983 debate inside the House of Lords it was declared that the
Elgin Marbles were never plundered from Greece and the return of the Marbles to Greece would be
detrimental to the collection of universal art at the British Museum). See also id. at 47 (explaining that
the Greeks, on the other hand, are well aware of the historical and cultural significance of the "Parthenon
Marbles," as they refer to them, and want them returned to their country of origin immediately). See
also id. at 77-78 (paraphrasing the Greek Director of the Department of Culture in Athens, Yannis
Tzedakis, who stated that the country where the Marbles were created has the right to recover significant
cultural heritage lost during periods of colonial or foreign invasion).
2Q Parthenon 2004 Campaign Website, Home, at http'//www.parthenon2004.com/ (last visited
February 22, 2005).
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Ottoman Empire, or the Turkish government, in Constantinople to dig at
the Acropolis and take artifacts away. 2' Greece was ruled by the Ottoman
Empire from 1443 until the 1800s. When the marbles were taken, Greece
was under Turkish control.267 The Turks had no cultural interest in pre-
serving Greek heritage.2" The transaction appears to be similar to a bribe,
a chance for the Turks to win favor with the British.269
Third, the situation points out the futility of international regulations,
in particular the 1970 UNESCO Convention and ICOM. In 1983, Greece
made a formal request to UNESCO for the return of the Marbles.270
During the procedure, Greece argued that the cultural treasures belonged to
the owner of the whole, here the Parthenon. Additionally it was argued that
the Marbles were held by Britain in trust. 271 Britain was allowed one year
to respond and did so in the negative.272
Interestingly, the Parthenon is not listed on UNESCO's list of World
Culture Heritage,273 which raises the question of objectivity with regards to
the Convention's procedure in creating the list. Further, Great Britain
withdrew from UNESCO subsequent to these procedures.27 4 In this situa-
tion, UNESCO's Convention proved hugely ineffective. The ability for a
UNESCO signatory to opt in and out of the Convention at whim when its
right to possess a controversial artifact falls into dispute proves yet another
shortcoming in the structure of the regulation.
Around the same time as the exercise of the UNESCO procedure,
ICOM passed a resolution on the "Return of Cultural Property to its Coun-
tries of Origin. "27s The resolution noted the moral rights of people to re-
cover significant elements of their cultural heritage dispersed as a conse-
quence of colonial or foreign occupation. The British museum delegates to
ICOM took no part in these discussions. In effect the ICOM resolution,
like the UNESCO Convention, did not aid Greece in recovering the
Marbles.276
Fourth, the Marbles were acquired by a museum, giving the ultimate
legitimacy to the antiquities. In this situation the British government, itself
266 Id. at 61.
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an ultimate actor in legitimizing illicit goods, purchased the Marbles and
gave them to the British Museum. 7 Although there was a Parliamentary
inquisition (a far more thorough check than the average collector is capable
of doing), Parliament was able to purchase the Marbles despite a
questionable acquisition from Greece. This indicates that even a properly
executed requisite check means very little in the curbing of illicit antiquities
trade. Ultimately, the encasement of the Marbles under the glass of a
museum display case somehow lends credence to the articles and method by
which they were acquired.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the legitimate art world is becoming more and more con-
cerned with the legal implications of circulating illicit cultural property,278
illicit art trade is still a multi-billion dollar business. According to General
Roberto Conforti, of Italy's Artistic Heritage Police, regardless of regulation
and legal implications, "[w~here there is money, there is crime."279 In a
market where items cross borders many times, and in an era of ever-
increasing globalization, international cooperation is key to the crackdown
on illicit antiquity trade.
Unfortunately, the very nature of antiquity looting contributes to illicit
trade. Antiquities are very valuable and relatively easy to liquidate. Couple
this with a situation of political unrest and/or poverty and it is commonsense
that antiquities will be exported illegally. However, a multinational,
cooperative approach to international and national regulation, along with
tougher restrictions on legitimate art actors, should be able to better control
antiquity trafficking.
Current regulations are weak and do little in preventing illicit trade.
International conventions like UNESCO and UNIDROIT have made
commendable attempts towards regulation but ultimately fall short in
effectiveness. This is primarily because no international tribunal has been
established to handle cases of illicit art trade, and countries are only
governed by the conventions once they have become signatories. The
realism of an opt-in, opt-out system renders any convention useless.
Further, governmental institutions, such as ICOM and INTERPOL, face
their own unique challenges in regulating and enforcing illicit trade.
27 Id. at 71.
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National laws are distinctive to individual nations. This creates a chal-
lenge in the development ofa cohesive, multinational approach to curb illicit
trade. The United States' laissez-faire attitude has grown more proactive
with the AAM regulations, Pre-Columbian Monumental Sculpture and
Murals Statute, and, in particular, with the CPIA. But, many countries have
not yet taken advantages of the bilateral agreements offered under the CPIA.
Also, there are actual conflicts between the regulations of various nations
presenting a choice of law issue.
Current regulation of legitimate auction houses, dealers, collectors, and
museums hardly exists. And, it is these actors, united with a continual
supply and demand for illicit antiquities, that significantly contribute to the
relative ease with which antiquities move between the legitimate and illegiti-
mate art markets. In the end, even factors that may seem relatively benign
in nature actually conspire against lawfulness to facilitate illicit antiquity
trade.

